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I. Motivation
As is true for many fisheries worldwide, the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of  Mexico
has been overfished due to excess commercial and recreational effort. Recreational effort
targeted toward red snapper stocks has increased substantially in recent years. In 20 years
the number of charter vessels increased by 149% and charter angler trips increased by
188% (GMFMC, 1999).
As a result, recreational harvests of red snapper in the Gulf have often exceeded
the total allowable catches (TAC) by a significant margin. Regulatory responses have
limited the recreational fishery in ways that have diminished the quality of the
recreational fishing experience (Sutinen and Johnston, 2003). For example, in 2001 a
moratorium was established on recreational reef fish permits and the season has been
shortened sharply in recent years. While these restrictions have reduced fishing pressure,
they have not fostered an efficient allocation of recreational effort.
As an alternative way to limit fishing effort, transferable rights (TRs) programs
are being increasingly considered in fisheries across the globe. TRs are usually
implemented as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), also called individual fishing
quotas(IFQs) in the commercial sector. However, examples of TRs in recreational
fisheries are few, and the literature appears to be limited. While a number of nations have
used transferable quota system for the commercial sector, including Canada, Iceland,
Australia, and New Zealand, the Alaska Halibut charter Individual Fishing Quota appears
to be the only recreational TRs program in the U.S.
1
                                                
1 Currently, a few federal ITQ/IFQ programs exist in the United States: for surf clams and
ocean quohogs in Mid-Atlantic and New Englnad waters; for wreckfish along the South
Atlantic coast; and for halibut and sablefish in Alaskan waters (FAO, 2001).2
Should transferable permits become legal, they offer the potential to increase
overall economic efficiency in both commercial and recreational fisheries by making it
possible for the fishermen who value the resource the most to harvest the fish. However,
before a system of TRs could be used, there are new variables that need to be considered
and questions that must be answered. This study will focus on developing a conceptual
foundation for the recreational TRs system because there is lacking in the literature a
fully developed model of how recreational ITQs would function
2. This study will,
therefore, consider the potential to use TRs program to overcome recent difficulties of the
recreational red snapper sector.
The principal objective of this paper is to study the potential use of TRs in the
recreational fisheries. Economically desirable institutions and structures to implement
TRs programs in recreational fisheries are investigated. In the next section we provide
background on the use of TRs in fisheries, highlighting the limited experience with
rights-based programs in recreational fisheries. We then provide a brief overview of the
specific rules that govern recreational fishing for red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico.  This
is important for a new approach to regulating recreational fishing will be most easily
implemented and accepted if it builds on existing institutions.
3 We then discuss the
critical design issues that must be answered if TRs are to be set up for the recreational
fisheries.
                                                
2 The basic theory behind ITQs in the commercial fisheries has been established since
Clark (1980) and there is a rich literature that has been studied the theoretical and
institutional characteristics of these policies.
3 We use the word institutions in this paper to describe “the rules and conventions that
define choice sets from which individuals, firms, households, and other decision-making
units choose courses of action” (Bromley 1989, p. 39)3
II. Literature review – rights based management of recreational fisheries
A. Transferable rights – background
In general, TRs have been studied in depth.
4 There is strong evidence that market-
based systems can be more efficient than command and control systems, in which sources
have less flexibility (see Repetto 2001). Should transferable permits become legal in the
U.S., they offer the potential to increase overall economic efficiency by making it
possible for fishermen, who value the resource the most, to harvest the fish.
As with any market, a TRs market will function properly if the property rights are
“complete.” Hanley, Shogren, and White (1997) elaborate:
“markets will be complete when traders can costlessly create a well-
defined property rights system such that a market will exist to cover any
exchange necessary. This well-defined property rights system represents a
set of entitlements that define the owner’s privileges and obligations … (p.
24).
More specifically, they state that the use of a resource will be efficient if the rights are
comprehensively assigned, exclusive, transferable, and secure.  Because TRs markets are
purposefully created by government, it is particularly important that these characteristics
be taken into account in their creation.
Scott (1989) discusses three ways in which ITQs can be an improvement over
existing regulations. The first of these is the advantage relative to the regulation of gear
types. When a quota is used, administrators need not concern themselves with gear, net
                                                
4 In fisheries, the theory is spelled out by, e.g., Clark (1990) and Anderson (1995).4
type and so on but instead focus on the issue of concern, the long-run management of the
stock. Second,  a quota system removes the incentive for a “race to the fish.” “Far from
being a racetrack under close official supervision, [with quotas] a fishery may take on the
appearance of a common rangeland, with the owners replacing fishery wardens in
checking on each other” (Scott 1989, p. 28). Third, a quota system can be preferred in the
management of mixed stocks.
Scott also points out that a quota system is not a substitute for regulation, but
instead requires reinforcement from government and substantial oversight.  He concludes
“there is no doubt that if the individual quotas exist, their owners can at some cost
contract with each other to coordinate them, to perform what are now regarded as
government functions (p. 29).”
A number of nations use transferable quota system including Iceland, New
Zealand, and  Australia (FAO, 2001). Haddad (1997) provides examples of New Zealand
and Iceland in terms of program design and implementation. The New Zealand case is
representative.  ITQs were created in 1993 to overcome economic and biological
problems. According to Haddad (1997), officially, the ITQ system “allocates to
individuals the transferable or tradable right to harvest a specific quantity of the fish stock
production.” In 1986, ITQs were first applied to stressed species found close to shore.
Haddad also reported that in creating ITQs, the New Zealand government’s goals
were to introduce tradable property rights, reduce the level of regulatory intervention, and
allow revenue through resource rental fees. With ITQ rights, fishermen can spread fishing
effort out over the entire year, be more selective in bypassing juvenile schools in favor of
higher-valued mature schools, and can purchase or lease additional quota to expand5
catch. These measures would protect the fishery while at the same time improving the
economics of the fishing industry.
B. Transferable rights in recreational fisheries
In case of recreational fisheries as well as commercial fisheries, National
Research Council (1999) reports that attention should be given to the implications of
recreational participation in the fishery, and to consider the potential application of the
ITQ to recreational fisheries. Sutinen et al. (2002) discuss some examples of rights-based
management’s applied to recreational sectors, the most important of which is the Alaskan
halibut fishery.
The examples of TRs in recreational fisheries are few and the literature appears to
be limited to only two reports: Sutinen, Johnston, and Shaw (2002); and Sutinen and
Johnston (2003). Recreational fisheries are commonly managed with target TACs that are
achieved indirectly using a combination of bag limits, size limits, and seasonal closures.
There are two allocation methods to allocate TACs. One is that commercial sector may
be subject to a hard TAC, in which the commercial fishery is closed when the quota is
met, while no hard cap on catch restricts the recreational sector. The other is that the TAC
is divided between the two sectors such that the commercial sector and recreational sector
each receives a percentage of the TAC (Sutinen et al., 2002).
C. The Alaska Halibut Fishery
Sutinen et al. (2002) study in detail the program proposed for the Alaska halibut
fishing since it is “the sole U.S. template for the design of joint commercial-recreational
rights-based management” (p.9). In the response of success of IFQ management in the6
commercial sector, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) approved
an IFQ program for the halibut charter fleet in Southeast and South-central Alaska on
April 14, 2001. As of May 2005 the program has not been yet implemented because there
are some practical issues to be solved. The IFQ program is expected to replace the
Guideline Harvest Level (GHL) program proposed by the NPFMC in February 2000
(NPFMC, 2001a).
The NPFMC report summarizes major features of the approved charter IFQ
program as follows (2001a): the program does not change the 2-fish daily bag limit or the
2-day possession limit for charter anglers. The charter quotas are issued to charter
owners, or to people who leased a vessel from an owner and who carried clients in 1998
or 1999 and 2000. The Charter IFQ is allocated 125% of the average 1995-99 charter
harvests, but these allocations may grow over time.  The charter IFQ would be integrated
into the existing commercial IFQ program and would be equal to about 13% of the
combined commercial and charter quota in Southeast Alaska and about 14% of the
combined commercial and charter quota in South-Central Alaska (NPFMC, 2001a).
More issues to implement charter IFQ program are included in the summary of
NPFMC (2001a):
• The proposed unit of recreational IFQs is the number of fish, in keeping with current
regulations.
• Charter quota shares may not be sold to the commercial sector but commercial shares
which are issued in pounds, may be transferred to the charter sector, translating
pounds to fish based on average weight.7
• The program does not affect non-charter recreational anglers. There would be a delay
of one year between the issuance of quota shares and fishing under the IFQ program.
There were concerns with the implementation of the charter IFQ program. One
was that IFQs may increase charter fishing prices and the other was enforcement of the
charter IFQs because traditional methods used to enforce commercial IFQs might not be
directly applicable to the recreational sector (Sutinen et al., 2002).
Practical issues that must be addressed in any transferable rights program are
evident in the minutes of the NPFMC’s committees (NPFMC 2001b and NPFMC 2003a).
For example, in 2001, enforcement issues such as prior notice of landings (PNOL),
offload window, vessel clearance requirement, and shipment report were reviewed and
considered (NPFMC, 2001a).
The NPFMC submitted the analysis of the charter IFQ program to NMFS in
May, 2003. The following approval process is anticipated: Secretary of Commerce
adoption in 2004; program development by NMFS in 2005 including calculation,
distribution, and appeals; and one year delay between the issuance of quota and fishing to
examine the geographic distribution of quota in 2006.  It is anticipated, therefore, that the
Alaska halibut charter IFQs may be in effect in 2007 (NPFMC, 2003b).
The Alaska halibut charter IFQ program is an example of a recreational fishery
because it is the first attempt of TRs in recreational fisheries. As IFQ programs are
developed in other regions, this program will provide valuable lessons about issues of
initial allocation, unit of rights, and transferability between sectors.8
III.   Existing institutional structure
Before a TRs program for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery can be considered, it is
important to first be aware of the existing institutional structure.
A. Red-Snapper Recreational fishing in the Gulf of Mexico
Red snapper recreational fishing regulations are based on the Reef Fish fishery
Management Plan (RFFMP) which was developed by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council (Council) in 1984. It was revised by 21 regulatory amendments to
overcome overfishing situation and to pursue sustainable fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico.
Until now, the main control tool for red snapper fisheries was total allowable
catch (TAC). GMFMC (2000) defines the TAC as “a level of fishing intended to obtain
optimum yield (OY) and to prevent overfishing, or to follow a recovery plan when a
stock is overfished. Annual changes to TAC or measures to attain TAC are implemented
through a regulatory amendment.” The Council sets a level of TAC from within the
acceptable biological catch (ABC) range which is intended to stop overfishing or keep
sustainability of fisheries.
Table 1 presents changes in the regulations that govern red snapper fishing in the
Gulf of Mexico from 1991 to 2003. The official TAC of the recreational sector was 1.96
million lbs in 1990 and increased to 4.47 million lbs in 1996. However, the TAC was not
enforced until 1997 and has remained constant at 4.47 million lbs since that year (Hood
and Steele, 2004). Recreational harvests of red snapper are estimated to have often
exceeded the TAC by significant margins, while commercial sector correspond with the
TAC (Sutinen and Johnston, 2003). The average of the difference between the9
recreational quota and harvest from 1991 to 2003 is 0.6 million lbs. The average of 0.6
million lbs consists of over 13.5% of total recreational allocation in 2003.
  There are three fishing regulations that are used in the red snapper recreational
fishing: 1) size limits, 2) bag limits, and 3) season closures. These fishing regulations are
most commonly used  in recreational fisheries. A bag limit as a mandatory restriction that
places an upper limit on the number of fish that an angler can retain during a fishing trip.
A size limit is a regulation such that a an angler can retain a fish only of it exceeds a
minimum size.
Recent regulatory amendments show a pattern of smaller bag limits and
increasing minimum size in the recreational sector. The RFFMP in 1984 established a
minimum size limit of 13 inches total length (TL) for red snapper with the exceptions that
for hire boats were exempted until 1987 and each angler could keep 5 undersize fish
(GMFMC, 2000). By 2003 the Council had set the recreational red snapper bag limit at 4
fish and set the recreational red snapper minimum size limit at 16 inches TL.
The recreational red snapper fisheries reveal a pattern in which open days have
decreased over time. The first closure of the fishery took place in 1997 when the season
was ended in late November. From 1990 to 1996, Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery
open days were 365 but decreased to 330 days in 1997 and only 194 days in 2003 (Hood
and Steele, 2004). The decreasing season length is the most important trend in
recreational red snapper management.
B. Fishing regulations and rules in the Gulf States
Table 2 presents a summary of the regulations that govern red snapper fishing in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2003.  It is notable that the fishery is already under relatively tight10
restrictions in terms of the size and bag limits, and season closures. The introduction of a
TRs program in the fishery would amount to a requirement that anglers possess an
additional authorization in order to fish for red snapper.
 In all states in the Gulf, anglers are currently required to hold a license, but it
appears that only in Texas is an additional red snapper stamp required, and that stamp is
valid for the entire red-snapper season. Hence, the introduction of a requirement that
anglers purchase a right to fish on a given day, would be rather new. However, short-term
rights are not unfamiliar in management of hunting and fishing. Three- and five-day non-
resident hunting and fishing rights are routinely issued in many states, often at rather
substantial fees.
5  Although residents may balk at the loss of their entitlement to fish
whenever they choose, the implementation of such a program would not be entirely new
and enforcement could be handled in the same fashion that license requirements are
currently enforced.
IV.   Critical questions that must be answered in the design of a transferable rights
program in red snapper recreational fishery.
In designing a TRs program for a recreational fishery, a number of issues must be
considered.  In this section we give a brief introduction to these issues. The basic system
that we envision is one in which TRs must be held by any angler fishing for red snapper
in the Gulf of Mexico. The questions revolve around the form that the rights would take,
and how trading will proceed. These questions are interrelated, but all must be addressed
if a program is to be established.
                                                
5 For example,  Arkansas charges $100 for a Nonresident 3-Day All Game Hunting
License (http://www.arkansasstripers.com/arkansas-hunting-fishing-license.htm).11
A. Who should hold rights?
The first question that must be determined is what organizational units might hold
rights. Traditionally in TRs programs, rights have been primarily held by individuals,
e.g., individual polluters or individual commercial fishermen. Dales (1968) called the
ownership scheme where the right is assigned to each individual “full ownership”.
However, it is noteworthy that Sutinen and Johnston (2003) argue that because of
difficulty of initial quota allocation and enforcement, angling rights for the market based
system should be assigned to Angling Management Organizations (AMOs) unlike
traditional IFQ management in which rights belongs to individuals. Angling Management
Organizations, consisting of groups of anglers, would be allocated the rights, and they
would then determine how those rights would be distributed to individual anglers. Dales
refers to the ownership scheme of allowing AMOs or common property institutions (see
Holland and Ginter, 2001) to hold the rights as “status-tenure or fixed tenure ownership”.
Alternatively, rights might be allocated to local or regional governments and then
distributed in a similar fashion.  Accordingly, there are 4 alternatives that might be
chosen, each with its respective advantages and disadvantages.
Alternative 1: Individual anglers
Alternative 2: For-hire recreational sector only
Alternative 3: Angling Management Organizations
Alternative 4: Local or regional government authorities
B. How should transferable Rights be measured?
The next question that must be answered is the units of measurement in which the
rights will be denominated. Dales (1968) argued that the divisibility of the right to which12
it is applied creates certain characteristics of a right ownership. For example, small right
can allow a larger number of individuals to own the rights. He introduced an “asset-unit”
as a term to explain the divisibility of the asset, and defined it as the smallest physical
amount of the asset to which it is practicable to apply property rights. In the recreational
fishery TRs program, it may be difficult to determine an asset-unit because of biological
characteristics, i.e., fishing mortality when fish are released, and individuals’ different
fishing preferences. However, three alternatives seem to be apparent:
Alternative 1: Set the unit of transferable rights in fish.
Alternative 2: Set the unit of transferable rights in fishing days.
Alternative 3: Set the unit of transferable rights in pounds of caught fish.
Under alternative 1, a single right would grant its holder a right to harvest one fish
(presumably of legal size). If anglers who purchase such rights rush to go fishing in the
certain season (e.g. summer),  biological problems could arise and fishing mortality
would be reduced. As with bag limits, a right denominated in fish creates a moral hazard
problem. If a recreational angler buys such a rights permit, he or she has an incentive to
discard caught fish (that may not survive), so that the right is essentially used several
times. Control and enforcement to avoid such behavior would be difficult.  However,
Sutinen, et al. (2002) point out that the rights granted to the recreational fishery in the
Alaskan Halibut program are denominated in fish to be as consistent as possible with
existing regulations.
Under alternative 2, rights would be stated in terms of a number of days for
fishing. If stated as a number of days, bag limits would probably be used to control total
catches per day. Relative to the other alternatives, a day-based right is more easily13
monitored and enforced, but introduces more uncertainty in the biological impact that
results.
Under alternative 3, rights would be stated in terms of a number of pounds of red
snapper. If stated as pounds, the total amounts of rights permits should be set to be equal
to the official TAC of the year. The advantage of this approach is that it would be most
directly comparable with the TAC and would reduce the incentive to discard undersize
fish since these would use up less of the angler’s right.  Still, because most anglers will
purchase relatively few permits and the stochastic nature of fishing exists, the limit on
pounds might cause anglers to discard fish in order to come close to using their complete
right.  The advantage to this alternative is that it would be easier to ensure that harvested
red snapper does not exceed the TAC.
In separate research, we theoretically investigate which measurement unit of TRs
would be preferred using a theoretical model for a  representative angler’s utility
maximization problem following Woodward and Griffin (2003). The results are
preliminary, but indicate that the right denominated by fish provides anglers with more
fishing days and time spending fishing, and the right denominated by days gives them
more fish landed.
C. How should temporal and spatial elements of TRs be handled?
Decisions must be made about a number of important restrictions that might be
placed on the purchased rights.  First, there is the spatial dimension: would permits be
valid in all Gulf states, or would the TAC be allocated across the states or even smaller
regions?  Based on the simplest conception of economic efficiency, economists would
typically argue for no spatial limitation so that rights could go to those areas where the14
permits are most valuable.  However, there may be equity considerations and if, for
example, the vast majority of the permits were purchased for use in a single state, this
could adversely affect the remaining states.  Hence, political forces may push for a fixed
allocation across states. Furthermore, as pointed out by Sutinen and Johnston (2003) if
rights became highly concentrated, this could lead to localized stock depletion.
Second there is the temporal dimension.  Here there are two issues that must be
resolved.  First, how long a permit would be valid – e.g., would unused permits expire at
the end of the year? There is strong evidence that such expirations would be
counterproductive (Hahn and Hester, 1989) as they would encourage use at the end of the
year when slight delay would actually be preferred for both by the anglers and in terms of
the biological health of the fishery.  The second issue is how to control how long a permit
would be valid for use.  Here, the answer is that regardless of the units of the right, that
right should have a limited life, probably a single day. Thus, since enforcement is
difficult, there must be a mechanism by which a right becomes invalid after its use, even
if the angler did not encounter a fisheries official at the end of the day.
D. How should transferable rights be allocated initially?
Oncethe form that TRs would take has been established, it must then be
determined how these will be allocated and transacted. When TRs are used in pollution
markets, it is common for right to be allocated to sources based on historical emissions.
Although we consider this possibility, it may not be a practical alternative in the case of a
recreational fishery.
Alternative 1: Grandfathering base on historical use.
Alternative 2: Auction15
Alternative 3: Federal Sale (retail at fixed price)
Alternative 4: Lottery
Under alternative 1, TRs can be initially allocated by historical catch records of
all eligible applicants who owned or operated a vessel. In addition, individual anglers
who keep fishing licenses and stamps for red snapper fisheries for a certain period can
join the initial allocation of the TRs. Because of the large number of anglers and the lack
of records, this system may not be practical. Because of the difficulty in establishing
grandfathered rights, Sutinen and Johnston (2003) argue that rights should instead be
grandfathered to regional AMOs.
Administrative decisions will be inevitably related to allocation process. The
advantage of allocation by administrative decision is that the regulatory authority can
maintain a very tight control and enforcement over individual transferable quotas
including interests of the wider community. On the other hand, it would be inefficient
since it is highly likely that a regulatory authority would have sufficient detail of the
demand structure for quotas of it to optimize the quota price no matter how much
fishermen value the price of rights (Morgan, 1995).
An aspect of grandfathering that should not be ignored is that the process of
determining who will receive rights creates an incentive for historical users of a resource
to reveal their use (Montero, Sanchez and Katz, 2002).  This not only determines who
will receive the right, but can help establish a system for monitoring future use.
Under alternative 2, the transferable rights permits can be initially distributed to
the public through an auction. The auction participants could be retail shops, which16
would then be allowed to trade the rights to angler organizations, recreational vessel
owners and individual anglers.
Auctions are frequently been used to transfer assets from public to private hands,
as in timber rights and off-shore oil leases, and when the seller is unsure about the values
that bidders are willing to pay. They also have the advantage of transparency, which is
important in such transactions. The uncertainty regarding values facing both sellers and
buyers is an important feature of auctions (Krishna, 2002). Economic efficiency of the
auction in the initial allocation of fisheries TRs might, however, depend on the detailed
mechanism of the auction. 
Morgan (1995) argued that the method of initially allocating fisheries quotas will
eventually move to auctions because quota allocation by administrative decision is
economically inefficient. He said that auctions offer two significant advantages over
other alternatives of resource allocation. First, the process is economically efficient due to
readily identified market demand and appropriate price for quotas. Second, the process
identifies those potential users of the resource with the highest use – values for the
fishery in question.
Using auctions to allocate initial fisheries transferable rights might be better than
using other alternatives because it identifies potential fishermen with the highest use
value of the fisheries and maximizes revenues in an economically efficient way.
Consequently, we  affirm more attention should be paid to designing fisheries rights
auction system.
The third option would be to sell the licenses at a fixed price.  For example, in the
red snapper case, rights might be held throughout the year by the GMFMC or National17
Marine Fisheries service (NMFS) and sold directly to the public. A disadvantage of this
approach is that the fixed price could create opportunities for rent-seeking behavior if the
price chosen by the agency is too low.  If at the set price demand exceeds supply, then it
is likely that a secondary market would arise, creating opportunities for profiteering by
those able to figure out the system and purchase their permits early.  If a fixed-price
approach is taken, governments may feel compelled to regulate transfers in a manner that
diminishes the potential for the market to efficiently allocate the permits.
Finally, a lottery can be used for the initial allocation of TRs. This approach is
followed in many recreational systems in which the supply of available use rights is less
than the demand.  In cases like the Gulf of Mexico’s red snapper fishery, the presence of
charter and “party” boats, which are commercial suppliers of recreational opportuinites,
might need to be handled separately.  Alternatively, TRs might be distributed to all
registered anglers by a drawing of lots and then only the winners would have demand for
the commercial services provided.  As with the fixed price system above, the potential for
a secondary market in TRs allocated by lottery is significant.
E. How trade will take place?
Once the initial allocation of rights is made, it is necessary to evaluate how the
rights will be transferred between those who hold the rights and those who want to go
fishing.
Alternative 1:  Trades take place in retail markets
Alternative 2:  All sales made by government
Transferability of rights requires the development of a market. Under alternative
1,  retail shops would be able to sell or buy rights. These could be sporting goods stores,18
bait and tackle shops, grocery stores, etc.; or transactions might take place between
private parties. Most current shops where fishing licenses are sold would be a potential
outlet for the sale of transferable rights.
Under alternative 2,  the rights would be sold only by government agencies.  This
would have the advantage of transparency and avoid the impression that private parties
are profiting from a public resource. But because governments are not able to easily
balance supply and demand in the market place, it is almost certain that supply and
demand would not be in equilibrium at the government set price.  If the price is set too
low, then demand would exceed supply and inefficient rationing would result.
Regardless of the approach taken, it is important that the license can be
transferred and used electronically. This will keep transaction costs low for purchasers
and sellers of licenses as well as for the government.  In addition, this would ensure that
localized scarcity does not arise.
F. Will speculation be allowed?
An issue related to the two previous points is whether or not retailers will be
allowed to sell permits at a profit.  Fishing licenses are typically sold at a fixed price
determined by the government with the seller usually receiving regulated issuance fees.
Since such licenses are not scarce, this approach is reasonable. However, if a TAC is to
be allocated through a market, efficiency requires that the price be allowed to vary
depending on supply and demand.  It is possible that this could cause public outcry if the
price was particularly high.  Nonetheless, with the advent of e-bay and similar online
market environments, the public is increasingly comfortable with the trading of assets
that previously had been unheard of. More critically, it is increasingly likely that there19
will be sufficient supply and demand to give the public confidence that the rights are
being traded at a “fair market price.”
Speculators in markets frequently play an important role in the creation of
markets. Demand for rights can be stimulated by speculators like futures and options
markets. In the red snapper case, rights permits can be more flexible and transferable if
speculation is allowed. The trades will more often occur in spring and summer, when
recreational demand is highest and speculators might actually smooth out price variability
throughout the year.  On the other hand, if speculators are able to gain market power,
then they might inefficiently manipulate the prices charged. Finally, speculation is likely
to lead to higher prices, meaning that the resulting price of the rights permit is too high
for some recreational anglers.  Using price as the rationing device has its advantages, but
it is clearly not equitable across all income groups.  That is a feature that many might
want to address.
G. Will the transfer between sectors be allowed?
Alternative 1: Transfer between commercial and recreational sectors is allowed
Alternative 2: No allowance between sectors
The transfer between commercial sector and recreational sector can be disputable.
Under alternative 1, the transfer between sectors is allowed. While unconstrained transfer
of the rights between sectors would provide the potential for benefits of recreational red
snapper rights markets, it could also cause regional depletion and insufficient supply in
each sector. Sutinen et al. (2002) provide an example of the Alaska Halibut fishery as a
restriction on trading between sectors. In the Alaskan program, charter boat operators can20
purchase IFQ shares from the commercial fishery, but shares originally allocated to the
charter sector (recreational sector) cannot be sold to the commercial sector.
Under alternative 2, the transfer between commercial and recreational sectors is
not allowed. In this case, the flexibility and transferability of markets can be weakened.
The reason for such a limitation would primarily be political, protecting the  rights of one
resource user group over those of another group. However, there are also efficiency based
reasons why such restrictions might be imposed. For example, a complete loss of rights to
commercial fishermen would have secondary impacts on local processing and
distribution networks.  In conditions of localized unemployment, such impacts should not
be ignored. Moreover, even in a fully employed economy, the transactions costs of
reallocating capital and labor should be considered.
H. How should the trade of TRs be monitored?
Alternative 1: Rights could be sold and traded with agency notification
Alternative 2: Rights could be sold and traded without agency notification
Under alternative 1, all trades should be reported to a government agency such as
GMFMC or NMFS. Under alternative 2, enforcement of transfer restrictions would be
difficult or impossible since there would be no monitoring of the rights permit trades. The
benefit of notification is that it facilitates enforcement of the overall cap and allows better
monitoring of fishing. The cost is in the form of transaction costs and some loss in
privacy. Transaction costs might be kept low if all trades are carried out electronically.21
I. How should monitoring and enforcement be carried out?
One of the central challenges of the TRs programs is the monitoring and
enforcement. Closures and gear restrictions are relatively easy to enforce. By contrast,
particularly in a multiple species fishery such as the Gulf, it is difficult to ensure that all
anglers fishing for red snapper have the necessary right. Sutinen and Johnston (2003)
point out that the more disaggregated that rights are distributed, the more difficult
monitoring becomes. In particular, they argue that the monitoring problem gives AMOs a
distinct advantage since the unit needed to be monitored would be much greater.  
However, at some point, individual behavior must be ensured because it is the
angler that harvest the fish.  Hence, regardless of whether the right is transferred directly
to the angler, or the angler receives the right indirectly through an AMO or a local
government agency, at some point individual behavior must be monitored. One thing to
note is that if rights are auctioned, this would generate revenue that would be available
for monitoring and the pool of money available for monitoring would be directly related
to the value of the rights. If the rights are extremely scarce, then they will command a
high price and the auction would generate substantial money for ensuring that the rights
are secure.  On the other hand, if the price of the rights is low, then little revenue would
be available but the incentive to fish without a license would also be low.
V. Concluding Remarks
In contrast to commercial fisheries which have been the center of ITQ studies, little
attention has been paid to the implementation of TRs in the recreational fishery. This
paper provide the background necessary to begin exploring in more detail the issues of
how a TRs program might be implementedin the red-snapper recreational fishery. In the22
paper we have briefly summarized the issues at stake  and present the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative solutions. These practical issues for ITQ programs in the
recreational sector were studied based on the literature and case studiesof successfully
implemented TRs programs, particularly in other areas (e.g., pollution credit markets and
commercial ITQ systems).
Although the use of TRs in recreational fisheries is a new idea, we believe that it
is an idea that has a great deal of merit and the institutional barriers are not
insurmountable.  Related research is taking this idea one step further, studying the
potential for such a program using the empirically based General Bioeconomic Fisheries
Simulation Model (GBFSM).
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1991 13 7 365 1.96 1.94
1992 13 7 365 1.96 3.03
1993 13 7 365 2.94 5.29
1994 14 7 365 2.94 4.26
1995 15 5 365 2.94 3.25
1996 15 5 365 4.47 3.57
1997 15 5 330 4.47 5.41
1998 15 4 272 4.47 5.76
1999 15 4 240 4.47 5.51
2000 16 4 194 4.47 3.92
2001 16 4 194 4.47 4.52
2002 16 4 194 4.47 5.32
2003 16 4 194 4.47 4.58
Source: History of red snapper management  in federal waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico
-1984-2004: 2004 Red Snapper SEDAR, NOAA Fisheries, SEDAR7-DW-40 (Hood and
Steele, 2004)Table 2: Recreational Saltwater Fishing Regulations 2003
LICENSE STAMP SIZE LIMIT BAG LIMIT SEASON 
g)
FEDERAL 
a) State License Required 16 in. TL 4 / person April 21-
October 31
TEXAS 
b) annual: 1yr (R & NR) Saltwater Fishing 15 in. TL 4 / person
trip: 3day,14day(R) & 5day(NR) Stamp Endorsement "
lifetime-n/a Required
FLORIDA 
c) annual: 1yr (R & NR) & 5yr (R) 20 in. TL(Atlantic) 2 / person (Atlantic)









annual- 1yr (R & NR) 16 in. TL 4 / person
trip: 1day,4day (NR) "
lifetime: (R only)
ALABAMA 
f) annual-1yr (R & NR) 16 in. TL 4 / person
trip-7day (R & NR) "
lifetime-n/a
Sources :
a. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council(http://www.gulfcouncil.org)
b. Texas parks and wildlife Department(http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us)
c. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (http://myfwc.com)
d. Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (http://www.dmr.state.ms.us)
e. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (http://www.wlf.state.la.us)
f. Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources -Marine Resources Div. (http://www.dcnr.state.al.us/MR)
g. Vary annually
Note :
R - Resident, NR - Non-Resident, and TL - Total Length